NATO-Georgia Commission Declaration at the Brussels Summit

Georgia tiene dos partes de su territorio: Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, independientes de facto del gobierno georgiano y apoyado por Rusia.

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La OTAN y el terrorismo, por Rafael Vidal

  1. We, NATO Heads of State and Government and Georgia, met in Brussels today to discuss security, defence reform, and cooperation.  Allies congratulate the people of Georgia on the centennial anniversary of their independence.  Allies and Georgia emphasize the unique scope and depth of Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance.  Allies welcome the substantial progress on reforms in Georgia over the past decade in consolidating its democracy and achieving stronger economic development, more effective defence institutions and modernized armed forces.  Georgia is committed to continue implementing these reforms.
  2. Georgia is one of the Alliance’s closest operational partners, and an Enhanced Opportunities Partner.  Allies highly appreciate Georgia’s steadfast support for NATO’s operations and missions, in particular its contribution to the NATO Response Force and its significant contribution to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).  Georgia is one of the largest troop contributors to RSM. We recognize the sacrifices and contributions the Georgian people have made to our shared security. These efforts, along with Georgia’s participation in EU-led operations, demonstrate Georgia’s commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security.
  3. NATO Heads of State and Government and Georgia welcome our expanding practical cooperation, in particular under the umbrella of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), to which all Allies contribute, as well as Finland and Sweden.  The SNGP is bolstering Georgia’s defence reform efforts, its interoperability with NATO, and Georgia’s resilience.  Allies commend Georgia on its commitment to implementation of the SNGP across the full spectrum of Georgia’s defence and security sector reforms.  We welcome the overall progress made, including the close cooperation that has developed between NATO and the Georgian defence institutions, such as the mentoring relationship of the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz with the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), the Defence Institution Building School, as well as Georgia’s participation in exercises. NATO and Georgia are ready to further enhance cooperation, including through the next NATO-Georgia exercise in March 2019, which Allies will support with broad participation. We are moving ahead with the establishment of secure communications with Georgia and stepping up our support in the area of counter-mobility.  We welcome our dialogue on hybrid threats and resilience.  We will consider further enhancement of cooperation in cyber defence to further strengthen interoperability.
  4. NATO Heads of State and Government value Georgia’s engagement in, and contributions to, strategic discussion and mutual awareness on Black Sea security. We pledge to further develop dialogue and practical cooperation in this context, including through the SNGP.  A number of new steps have already been initiated in this regard.  We welcome Georgia’s offers to provide further logistical support to NATO and Allies, the start of training of Georgian Coast Guard boarding teams, the enhanced interaction between Georgia and NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, including through passage exercises and port calls, and the exchanges between Georgia’s Joint Maritime Operations Centre and the NATO Shipping Centre.  Allies intend to assist Georgia in the extension of its air and maritime picture.  We also look forward to Georgia’s future participation in Operation Sea Guardian.
  5. NATO Heads of State and Government welcome the clear progress made by Georgia on defence spending and in implementing comprehensive reforms aimed at strengthening Georgia’s defence and resilience capabilities.
  6. Georgia reaffirms its determination to achieve NATO membership, one of its top foreign and security policy priorities, which is backed by strong public support, and is now also enshrined in its new Constitution.  Allies reiterate their decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance, with MAP as an integral part of the process; they reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions.  They welcome the significant progress made since 2008. Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership, in particular the NATO-Georgia Commission, the Annual National Programme and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. Allies recognize the significant progress on reforms which Georgia has made and must continue, which are helping Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its preparations towards membership, and which strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance.  
  7. NATO Heads of State and Government reiterate our full support for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.  We call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the so-called independence of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia. We condemn the grave human rights violations taking place in these regions, their militarization, as well as other activities such as the construction of barbed wire fences and other artificial border-like obstacles along the Administrative Boundary Line.  These steps violate Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and blatantly contradict the principles of international law, OSCE principles and Russia’s international commitments.  We further call on Russia to implement the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, in particular to withdraw its forces from the territory of Georgia, which are present without Georgia’s consent, and allow the creation of an international security arrangement on the ground.  We welcome Georgia’s compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement and its commitment on non-use of force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We also support Georgia’s efforts toward engagement and confidence building and welcome the Georgian Government’s new peace initiative “A step to a Better Future” to improve the lives of the people living in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia regions of Georgia.  Allies express firm support to the Geneva International Discussions, co-chaired by the EU, UN and OSCE, and underline the utmost need for reaching tangible results on the core issues of the negotiations with the aim to pursue peaceful conflict resolution within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia.
  8. Our meeting, marking the tenth anniversary of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), demonstrates the depth, breadth and enduring nature of the NATO-Georgia relationship.  Looking ahead, we expect the NGC to continue to play a central role in deepening political dialogue and enhancing practical cooperation between Georgia and the Alliance.

Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

  1. Two years ago in Warsaw, we came together to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation aiming to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Our respective efforts are mutually reinforcing, have improved the security of our citizens and strengthened our trans-Atlantic bond. Our longstanding cooperation has developed substantially, and is now unprecedented in its quality, scope and vigour. We share the same values and resolve to address, hand-in-hand, the common challenges we face. As our security is interconnected, we meet today in Brussels to reaffirm the importance of and the need for cooperation, and underline that our security and defence initiatives benefit each other.
  2. In consultation with the EU Member States and the NATO Allies, working with and for the benefit of all, our partnership will continue to take place in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members.
  3. In this context, we view transparency as crucial. We encourage the fullest possible involvement of the NATO Allies that are not members of the EU in its initiatives. We encourage the fullest possible involvement of the EU Member States that are not part of the Alliance in its initiatives.
  4. Our two organisations have developed a broad range of tools to provide greater security to citizens in Europe and beyond, building on the substantial cooperation established more than 15 years ago between NATO and the EU, two unique and essential partners.
  5. We are implementing the objectives we set two years ago, including the following actions:
    • Our maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean contributes to fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking, and thus alleviates human suffering;
    • We have increased our ability to respond to hybrid threats: we reinforce our preparedness for crises, we exchange timely information including on cyber-attacks, we confront disinformation, we build the resilience of our members and partners and we test our respective procedures through parallel and coordinated exercises;
    • We support the defence and security capacity of our neighbours to the East and to the South.
  6. The multiple and evolving security challenges that our Member States and Allies face from the East and the South make our continued cooperation essential, including in responding to hybrid and cyber threats, in operations, and by helping our common partners. We are committed to deepen it further within the existing common proposals. It is now important to focus on implementation. In this context, we will aim for swift and demonstrable progress in particular in:
    • military mobility;
    • counter-terrorism;
    • strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks;
    • promoting the women peace and security agenda.
  7. We welcome EU efforts to bolster European security and defence to better protect the Union and its citizens and to contribute to peace and stability in the neighborhood and beyond. The Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund contribute to these objectives.
  8. We welcome efforts undertaken by NATO in collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, to ensure the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area, notably through deterrence and defence, projecting stability and the fight against terrorism. NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role as the cornerstone of collective defence for all Allies.
  9. EU efforts will also strengthen NATO, and thus will improve our common security. For NATO Allies, such efforts foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities, in full accordance with their commitment undertaken in the Defence Investment Pledge. For EU Member States, we welcome political agreement to give higher priority to security and defence in the forthcoming discussions on the next long-term EU budget.
  10. The capabilities developed through the defence initiatives of the EU and NATO should remain coherent, complementary and interoperable. They should be available to both organisations, subject to the sovereign decisions of the countries that own them.
  11. We are proud of what has been achieved together so far. But we can do more. We will continue to review progress on a yearly basis.

Press Release. 10.07.2018. NATO

Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)

 

NATO collects defence expenditure data from Allies on a regular basis and presents aggregates and subsets of this information. Each Ally’s Ministry of Defence reports current and estimated future defence expenditure according to an agreed definition of defence expenditure. The amounts represent payments by a national government actually made, or to be made, during the course of the fiscal year to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. In the figures and tables that follow, NATO also uses up-to-date economic and demographic information available from the Directorate- General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (DG-ECFIN), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

In view of differences between both these sources and national GDP forecasts, and also the definition of NATO defence expenditure and national definitions, the figures shown in this report may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by media, published by national authorities or given in national budgets. Equipment expenditure includes expenditure on major equipment as well as on research and development devoted to major equipment. Personnel expenditure includes pensions paid to retirees.

The cut-off date for information used in this report was 2 July 2018. Figures for 2017 and 2018 are estimates.

El problema de la inmigración en Europa: Análisis de Política Exterior

AGENDA DE POLÍTICA EXTERIOR DE 29.06.2018

Inmigración, Europa y el día de la marmota. Ruth Ferrero

Resulta incomprensible la ausencia de imaginación de los líderes europeos en materia migratoria. Parece que no se dieran cuenta de que el mantenimiento de las mismas fórmulas no ha dado resultado, como, por otro lado, es evidente a la luz de la situación actual. Y, sin embargo, se siguen utilizando las mismas fórmulas discursivas y políticas que ya fracasaron con anterioridad. Leer mas …

Un debate viejo en un contexto nuevo, Amparo González Ferrer 

Si de verdad queremos acoger, empecemos por aquí, Marga León

El ‘Aquarius’ como ventana de oportunidad, Markus González Beilfuss

Una política ineficaz con efectos indeseados, Gonzalo Fanjul y Virginia Rodríguez

Pregunta-Respuesta: sobre inmigración y refugio, Agenda Pública y Política Exterior

El Consejo Europeo del 28 y 29 de junio ha estado centrado en la inmigración más que en cualquier otro de los asuntos en la agenda. Finalmente, se ha aprobado la creación de lo que denominan “centros controlados de acogida”. ¿Qué son? ¿Qué ventajas y riesgos presentan para la gestión de la migración y el refugio? Leer más…

La xenofobia ahoga la agenda de la UE, Jorge Tamames

La cumbre de los jefes de gobierno y Estado de la Unión Europea ha mostrado el grado de crispación de los europeos, con choques difíciles de reconciliar en torno a las políticas de acogida de la UE. No se vislumbran soluciones de consenso. La Unión se encasilla en posiciones reaccionarias. Leer más…

Los líderes de la UE acuerdan la creación voluntaria de centros para inmigrantes

La Vanguardia. 29.06.2018


Los refugiados tendrán derecho a permanecer en los Veintiocho, mientras que los inmigrantes económicos serían devueltos

Pedro Sánchez cree que “no es el mejor” acuerdo, pero está satisfecho porque España sale beneficiada

 

 

 

¿QUÉ SE PUEDE HACER EN UN AÑO EN POLÍTICA EXTERIOR?

 

La carta de Pedro Sánchez a su primer Consejo Ministros es clara en las ambiciones y limitaciones del nuevo Gobierno. Entre las primeras está “recuperar el papel protagonista de España en la construcción europea”. Sánchez asume que la Unión Europea es la única vía para que España pueda afrontar desafíos como el cambio climático, la despoblación, la precariedad, la desigualdad, las migraciones y la seguridad. Nada de ello es retórica europeísta. Es una realidad.

Debate Politico de Politica Exterior 21.06.2018

Versión origina:

Agena Pública. 21.06.2018