Jugar con fuego: la UE flirtea con un nuevo cambio de fronteras en los Balcanes

Serbia y Kosovo negocian intercambiar territorios según criterios étnicos como paso previo a normalizar sus relaciones.

El presidente de Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, apoya una corrección de la frontera

El presidente de Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, apoya una corrección de la frontera Laura Hasani/Reuters

EUROPA EUROPA

Serbia y Kosovo negocian intercambiar territorios según criterios étnicos como paso previo a normalizar sus relaciones.

Juan Sanhermelando Bruselas

¿Es la solución para un acuerdo histórico que garantice una paz duradera, estabilice de forma definitiva los Balcanes y acelere su integración en la UE? ¿O se trata por el contrario de una nueva chispa que podría reavivar los conflictos étnicos que llevaron a las guerras de Yugoslavia en los años 90? Serbia y Kosovo negocian desde hace semanas redibujar su frontera siguiendo criterios étnicos como paso previo a normalizar de forma permanente sus relaciones. Una perspectiva que incomoda a la UE y a EEUU, que se habían comprometido a no volver a alterar las fronteras en la región.

La próxima cita clave tendrá lugar el próximo viernes 7 de septiembre. El presidente de Serbia, Aleksander Vucic, y el de Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, se reúnen de nuevo en Bruselas para reanudar un diálogo que se encuentra ya en su “recta final”. Ambos líderes participaron juntos a finales de agosto en una mesa redonda en Austria. Allí confirmaron que las conversaciones entre ambos están avanzadas y se centran en una “corrección” (ese es el eufemismo que utilizan) de la frontera. Pese a que aseguran no soportarse mutuamente, durante la conferencia exhibieron incluso signos de complicidad y un frente común para pedir a la UE que apoye cualquier acuerdo.

Los dos líderes parecen decididos a invertir todo su capital político en lograr un acuerdo que permitiría a Serbia entrar en breve en la UE y a Kosovo lograr algún tipo de aval de la ONU y avanzar también en sus aspiraciones europeas. Kosovo declaró unilateralmente su independencia de Belgrado en 2008, casi una década después de la intervención de la OTAN para frenar la limpieza étnica que estaba llevando a cabo el régimen serbio de Sloboban Milosevic en la entonces provincia rebelde. Cinco países de la UE todavía no reconocen a Kosovo: España, Chipre, Grecia, Rumanía y Eslovaquia.

“Queremos garantizar a los países vecinos y a la UE que no deben tener miedo de un acuerdo de paz entre Kosovo y Serbia, incluso si ese acuerdo implica una corrección de la frontera. No seremos los primero ni los últimos en hacer correcciones fronterizas a cambio de la paz”, dijo Thaçi en Austria. “Un conflicto congelado no puede durar así para siempre, nadie puede controlarlo. Alguien puede descongelarlo un día y entonces tendremos una guerra. Y ninguno de nosotros quiere una guerra”, avisó el presidente de Serbia. Ambos piden a Bruselas que avale un posible pacto.

De momento, ninguna de las dos partes ha explicado en qué consistiría exactamente el intercambio de territorio. Pero se da por hecho que lo que están discutiendo es el canje de la zona norte de Kosovo (al norte del río Ibar), cuya población es de mayoría serbia y que pasaría a formar parte de Serbia; a cambio del valle de Presevo, un área de mayoría albanesa al sur de Serbia y que ahora se entregaría a Kosovo.

¿Efecto contagio?

“No es la mejor solución ni la más deseable”, explica a EL ESPAÑOL Salvador Llaudes, investigador para Europa del Real Instituto Elcano. “Serbia y Kosovo son ya bastante homogéneos en términos culturales/religiosos y lo que va a pasar con este intercambio es que se vuelvan ya del todo homogéneos. Sería una derrota asumir que los países, las sociedades, no pueden ser culturalmente heterogéneos. Además, tener una población homogénea tampoco reduce el conflicto, como demuestra la experiencia histórica”, relata Llaudes.

Pero la principal preocupación es que el cambio de fronteras abra una caja de Pandora que desestabilice al resto de países de los Balcanes. El peligro es especialmente grave en el caso de Bosnia-Herzegovina, donde conviven tres comunidades en conflicto latente: serbios, croatas y bosníacos. “El canje puede dar alas a aquellos que creen que lo mejor que le puede pasar al Estado bosnio es desaparecer o verse menguado de manera irremediable, por ejemplo con la independencia de la república Srpska (de mayoría serbia) o la separación de Herzegovina (de mayoría croata)”, señala el investigador del Instituto Elcano. Pero también podría reavivar el enfrentamiento en Macedonia entre albaneses y macedonios.

La alteración de las fronteras podría ser esgrimida además como antecedente por otros movimientos independentistas en Europa. De hecho, el expresidente de la Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, se apresuró a retuitear el pasado lunes una noticia del portal Vilaweb que decía que “los presidentes de Serbia y Kosovo confirman que están negociando el reconocimiento de la independencia”. “Los independentistas, ya sea en Cataluña o en cualquier otra parte del mundo, siempre se van a acoger a cualquier mínimo detalle o experiencia a nivel internacional que ellos entiendan que pueda servir a su causa”, dice Llaudes.

02.09.2018. El Español. Leer más

“Iglesia y Guerra en la Edad Media”, el extra de la Revista de Historia Militar para este verano

El monográfico sobre “Iglesia y Guerra en la Edad Media” ha sido el elegido para el número extraordinario de la Revista de Historia Militar, que se ha publicado este verano y que cuenta con artículos de especialistas en historia medieval del mundo universitario y de la investigación.

Entre ellos, los dedicados al ascendiente eclesiástico en el lenguaje bélico jurídico e institucional de la Castilla de los siglos XIII y XIV, a los santos guerreros y santos asesores en la lucha contra el Islam en los reinos ibéricos, o al papel de la Iglesia frente a las incursiones vikingas, entre otros.

El ejemplar está disponible a través del enlace en la hemeroteca de la Revista en Internet.

https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/revista-de-historia-militar-revistas-pdf-19869.html

El sumario desglosado es el siguiente:

El ascendiente eclesiástico en el lenguaje bélico jurídico e institucional de Castilla (ss. XIII-XIV), por doña Ana ARRANZ GUZMÁN, profesora de Historia Medieval de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Santos guerreros y santos asesores en la lucha contra el Islam en los reinos ibéricos, por doña Isabel BECEIRO PITA, investigadora del CSIC

La fortificación del episcopado en la Corona de Castilla, por don Manuel RETUERCE VELASCO profesor de Arqueología de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, y don José Javier DE CASTRO FERNÁNDEZ, miembro de la Asociación de Amigos de los Castillos

Fray Hernando de Talavera: mediación económica y comunicación política en la Guerra de Granada (1491-1492), por don Francisco de Paula CAÑAS GÁLVEZ, profesor de Historia Medieval de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Los legados pontificios y la guerra en la Península Ibérica (siglos X-XII), por don Fernando RODAMILANS RAMOS, doctor en Historia Medieval (UCM) y profesor de la Fundación Educatio Servanda

La Iglesia frente a las incursiones vikingas, por don Iván CURTO ADRADOS, doctorando de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Rusia, EE.UU., China y la OTAN en 04.08.2018

 

Rusia va a otro nivel con sus armas respecto a EEUU 

Posted on: Monday 30 July 2018 — 13:29

Lamentablemente los Estados Unidos no puede igualarse al mismo nivel que Rusia ha alcanzado en los últimos años con respecto a las nuevas armas que han logrado desarrollar, así lo afirma el periodista Marco Maier en su artículo para la revista Contra Magazin.

“El Kremlin demostró a la Casa Blanca que se pueden crear equipos militares modernos y competitivos sin utilizar presupuestos militares extremadamente inflados”, destaca Maier.

Según ha explicado el columnista, el aumento de los gastos mili… Sigue leyendo →

El destructor USS Winston S. Churchill en Estonia 

Posted on: Sunday 29 July 2018 — 19:28

Nada más y nada menos que el destructor USS Winston S. Churchill de la Marina de Guerra americano ha llegado al puerto de Muuga, situado a 13 km de la ciudad de Tallin, aseveró James D. Melville, embajador de Estados Unidos en Estonia.

“El arribo de este buque a Estonia es otro ejemplo de la importancia que tienen la estabilidad regional, el apoyo a los aliados y la cooperación entre las fuerzas”, dijo el embajador citado por el servicio de prensa de la embajada.

Por otra parte Melville ha de… Sigue leyendo

China preparada para el S-400 de Rusia  

Posted on: Sunday 29 July 2018 — 13:30

Próximamente en las siguientes semanas, la potencia asiática, China, va a realizar pruebas al novedoso sistema de defensa aérea ruso s-400, para hacer un estudio más profundo de sus capacidades al momento de derribar misiles balísticos.

La revista de Estados Unidos “the Diplomat”, aseguró este viernes tras recibir la totalidad de los componentes de la primera unidad de los S-400 rusos, el Ejército de China ya tiene pensado probar este sistema de armamento en un escenario simulado en el cual deb… Sigue leyendo

Incidentes militares entre Rusia y EEUU ¿Pueden evitarse? 

Posted on: Saturday 28 July 2018 — 21:55

Alexandr Grushkó, viceministro de relaciones exteriores de Rusia, ha debatido con varios expertos de Estados Unidos en control de armas las posibilidades de evitar incidentes militares, así como la situación en cuanto al acuerdo START y el Tratado de Fuerzas Nucleares de Alcance Intermedio (INF), informó la Cancillería rusa.

“Tuvo lugar un intercambio de puntos de vista sobre temas de actualidad relacionados con la estabilidad estratégica, fijando la atención en el análisis de la situación en to… Sigue leyendo

Infraestructura Crítica, sector de la Energía: La Seguridad Energética

Seguridad energética: una preocupación fundamental para los aliados y socios.

Energy security plays an important role in our common security:  Brussels Summit Declaration, 2018.

Ten years ago, at their 2008 Summit in Bucharest, NATO Allies agreed their first report on NATO’s role in energy security. Negotiating this confidential paper, which listed major principles as well as key areas of engagement, was challenging.

No one doubted that energy developments could have major security implications for Allies and the Alliance. After all, in particular for some of NATO’s new members that were burdened with serious energy vulnerabilities, energy security was a question of national security. However, given that NATO was not an energy institution, Allies struggled to define NATO’s role in an area that was largely non-military in nature, featured many institutional players and, above all, remained mostly a national responsibility. Accordingly, the Allies defined a broad political framework, yet without suggesting a concrete energy security agenda for the Alliance.

Today, a decade later, the caution that characterised NATO’s initial steps in energy security has given way to a more confident approach. Major changes in the international security environment and energy landscape have brought increased strategic attention to the issue, resulting in a pragmatic energy security agenda that provides tangible value for Allies and partner countries.

How has this change come about?

Global energy developments

The most important driver for NATO’s energy agenda has been the evolution of the global energy landscape. Russia has continued to use energy as part of its foreign policy and, in the case of Ukraine, also demonstrated that energy is part of Moscow’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

Cyber threats have been growing, with the energy sector a major target.

Attacks on NATO fuel convoys in Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of assuring energy supplies to military operations.

Terrorist attacks against energy infrastructure, notably in Northern Africa and the Middle East, have continued, with an average of about 350 incidents per year.

Piracy has remained a threat to tankers carrying oil from the Gulf region through the Indian Ocean – a challenge that NATO’s counter-piracy operation Ocean Shield helped to address.

Other threats to energy infrastructure have been posed by disasters, such as the 2010 Pakistan floods and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011.

Finally, the rise of “unconventionals” – such as shale oil and gas – has revolutionised the global energy landscape, with potentially massive ramifications for traditional producers.

A coherent agenda

With all these developments bringing home the close link between energy and security, NATO has had its work cut out for it. While the classified Bucharest report remained the overarching guideline for NATO’s role in energy security, the 2010 Strategic Concept, as well as the Progress Reports presented to NATO Heads of State and Government at each NATO Summit, have provided additional guidance and also sketched out a way ahead. This has allowed NATO to develop an unclassified energy security narrative that it could also promote publicly.

To simplify an otherwise complex story, NATO has divided its role into three areas:

    • Raising awareness includes intelligence-sharing on energy development, political consultations among Allies, as well as among Allies and partners, and exchanges with outside experts.
    • Supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure is mainly about sharing best practices among experts, organising training courses, and inserting energy-related scenarios into exercises.
    • Enhancing energy efficiency in the military includes the sharing of national best practices, demonstrations of energy-efficient equipment, and the development of military energy efficiency standards.

Building a stakeholder community

To better define NATO’s role in energy security and to avoid duplicating the work of others, it has been important to reach out to other energy players. NATO has established working-level contacts with the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Directorate-General for Energy of the European Commission, and experts from academia and the private sector. To enhance energy efficiency in the military, the stakeholder community has also included military engineers and defence companies. This outreach, along with enhanced public diplomacy activities, has made NATO’s role in energy security both clearer and more widely known.

The accreditation of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (COE) in Lithuania in 2012 brought another powerful player into the equation. The COE, which has meanwhile expanded to include 11 member nations, provides analysis and training across the entire spectrum of NATO’s energy security agenda and serves as a unique asset for supporting and promoting NATO’s energy security agenda.

NATO’s two Strategic Commands have also become interested in the issue, contributing with expertise as well as with support on education and training.

Reaching the strategic level

Another major goal was reached in 2014, when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) held an informal meeting with energy experts. These discussions, featuring representatives of the IEA, the European Commission and the US State Department, turned out to be so insightful that Allies decided to turn the “Energy NAC” into an annual event. Energy security had arrived at the strategic level.

A year later the first Energy Security Strategic Awareness Course took place at the NATO School in Oberammergau. With participants from over 20 Allies and partner countries, the course covered a broad spectrum of energy challenges, ranging from the geopolitics of oil and gas to enhancing the energy efficiency of armed forces. Supported by NATO’s Strategic Commands, the COE and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, it has now become an annual event and a model for courses elsewhere.

Enhancing partnerships

NATO’s evolving role in energy security has attracted the interest of several partner countries, notably energy producers such as Azerbaijan and Algeria and transit countries such as Georgia and Ukraine.

Consequently, NATO has organised various expert workshops on, for example, exchanging best practices on the protection of critical energy infrastructure, often with the support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme.

In February 2018, NATO held its first energy security course at the newly created NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Cooperation Centre in Kuwait. And several partner countries, notably Ukraine, briefed Allies on their respective energy situation.

Hybrid war and collective defence

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its low-level war against Ukraine have added an important new dimension to NATO’s energy agenda: the linkage between energy and hybrid warfare. To destabilise Ukraine, Russia had increased the gas price, supported separatists with energy deliveries and expropriated Ukrainian energy assets in and around Crimea. To support Ukraine, the Energy Security COE and various other players held a major table-top exercise in Kyiv in October 2017, centred on protecting the country’s electrical grid against cyber attacks.

As NATO has refocused its efforts on bolstering the collective defence of its eastern member states, the energy question has posed itself in yet another light: meeting the energy challenges of a military strategy that relies on major reinforcements. To come to grips with this new challenge, military energy requirements have been analysed, and NATO has started to integrate energy considerations into some of its exercises.

The “smart energy” agenda, which aims to enhance energy efficiency in the military, has also made progress: energy-related questions have been inserted into the NATO Defence Planning Process, as a prerequisite for setting interoperability standards. Moreover, the Energy Security COE hosts a biennial event to explore “Innovative Energy Solutions for Military Application” (see IESMA 2018).

The way ahead

The years ahead will see an even stronger focus on education and training, notably with partner countries. More energy-related scenarios will be inserted into NATO exercises, and table-top exercises with Allies and partners are likely to increase in number as well as complexity.

A particular new focus of NATO’s energy-related work will be enhancing the resilience of Allies. Since resilient energy supplies are vital for collective defence, NATO support for Allies in this area is likely to increase. It is also fair to assume that addressing cyber threats to energy infrastructure will gain in importance. While the protection of energy infrastructure remains a national responsibility, NATO’s education and training establishments offer many opportunities – for Allies and partners alike – to get a firm grasp on these challenges.

NATO’s relations with other actors, from the IEA to the private energy sector, will also deepen, allowing NATO to benefit from outside expertise. The number of briefings to the NAC by outside experts is also likely to increase.

Finally, there is a need for more regular consultations among Allies on energy security developments and their security implications. The Brussels Summit Declaration states: “… it is essential to ensure that the members of the Alliance are not vulnerable to political or coercive manipulation of energy, which constitutes a potential threat”. Given Russia’s use of energy as part of its hybrid threats towards Ukraine, it would seem that NATO Allies, many of which are customers of Russian gas and oil, might have a lot to discuss.

Julijus Grubliauskas and Michael Rühle work in the Energy Security Section of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. The views expressed are their own.

What is published in NATO Review does not necessarily represent the official position or policy of member governments, or of NATO.

NATO Review 26.07.2018

NATO-Georgia Commission Declaration at the Brussels Summit

Georgia tiene dos partes de su territorio: Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, independientes de facto del gobierno georgiano y apoyado por Rusia.

Para ampliar esta apreciación se puede consultar el libro publicado por el Foro, en el siguiente enlace:

La OTAN y el terrorismo, por Rafael Vidal

  1. We, NATO Heads of State and Government and Georgia, met in Brussels today to discuss security, defence reform, and cooperation.  Allies congratulate the people of Georgia on the centennial anniversary of their independence.  Allies and Georgia emphasize the unique scope and depth of Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance.  Allies welcome the substantial progress on reforms in Georgia over the past decade in consolidating its democracy and achieving stronger economic development, more effective defence institutions and modernized armed forces.  Georgia is committed to continue implementing these reforms.
  2. Georgia is one of the Alliance’s closest operational partners, and an Enhanced Opportunities Partner.  Allies highly appreciate Georgia’s steadfast support for NATO’s operations and missions, in particular its contribution to the NATO Response Force and its significant contribution to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).  Georgia is one of the largest troop contributors to RSM. We recognize the sacrifices and contributions the Georgian people have made to our shared security. These efforts, along with Georgia’s participation in EU-led operations, demonstrate Georgia’s commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security.
  3. NATO Heads of State and Government and Georgia welcome our expanding practical cooperation, in particular under the umbrella of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), to which all Allies contribute, as well as Finland and Sweden.  The SNGP is bolstering Georgia’s defence reform efforts, its interoperability with NATO, and Georgia’s resilience.  Allies commend Georgia on its commitment to implementation of the SNGP across the full spectrum of Georgia’s defence and security sector reforms.  We welcome the overall progress made, including the close cooperation that has developed between NATO and the Georgian defence institutions, such as the mentoring relationship of the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz with the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), the Defence Institution Building School, as well as Georgia’s participation in exercises. NATO and Georgia are ready to further enhance cooperation, including through the next NATO-Georgia exercise in March 2019, which Allies will support with broad participation. We are moving ahead with the establishment of secure communications with Georgia and stepping up our support in the area of counter-mobility.  We welcome our dialogue on hybrid threats and resilience.  We will consider further enhancement of cooperation in cyber defence to further strengthen interoperability.
  4. NATO Heads of State and Government value Georgia’s engagement in, and contributions to, strategic discussion and mutual awareness on Black Sea security. We pledge to further develop dialogue and practical cooperation in this context, including through the SNGP.  A number of new steps have already been initiated in this regard.  We welcome Georgia’s offers to provide further logistical support to NATO and Allies, the start of training of Georgian Coast Guard boarding teams, the enhanced interaction between Georgia and NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, including through passage exercises and port calls, and the exchanges between Georgia’s Joint Maritime Operations Centre and the NATO Shipping Centre.  Allies intend to assist Georgia in the extension of its air and maritime picture.  We also look forward to Georgia’s future participation in Operation Sea Guardian.
  5. NATO Heads of State and Government welcome the clear progress made by Georgia on defence spending and in implementing comprehensive reforms aimed at strengthening Georgia’s defence and resilience capabilities.
  6. Georgia reaffirms its determination to achieve NATO membership, one of its top foreign and security policy priorities, which is backed by strong public support, and is now also enshrined in its new Constitution.  Allies reiterate their decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance, with MAP as an integral part of the process; they reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions.  They welcome the significant progress made since 2008. Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership, in particular the NATO-Georgia Commission, the Annual National Programme and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. Allies recognize the significant progress on reforms which Georgia has made and must continue, which are helping Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its preparations towards membership, and which strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance.  
  7. NATO Heads of State and Government reiterate our full support for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.  We call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the so-called independence of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia. We condemn the grave human rights violations taking place in these regions, their militarization, as well as other activities such as the construction of barbed wire fences and other artificial border-like obstacles along the Administrative Boundary Line.  These steps violate Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and blatantly contradict the principles of international law, OSCE principles and Russia’s international commitments.  We further call on Russia to implement the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, in particular to withdraw its forces from the territory of Georgia, which are present without Georgia’s consent, and allow the creation of an international security arrangement on the ground.  We welcome Georgia’s compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement and its commitment on non-use of force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We also support Georgia’s efforts toward engagement and confidence building and welcome the Georgian Government’s new peace initiative “A step to a Better Future” to improve the lives of the people living in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia regions of Georgia.  Allies express firm support to the Geneva International Discussions, co-chaired by the EU, UN and OSCE, and underline the utmost need for reaching tangible results on the core issues of the negotiations with the aim to pursue peaceful conflict resolution within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia.
  8. Our meeting, marking the tenth anniversary of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), demonstrates the depth, breadth and enduring nature of the NATO-Georgia relationship.  Looking ahead, we expect the NGC to continue to play a central role in deepening political dialogue and enhancing practical cooperation between Georgia and the Alliance.